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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
therefore, if a presumption of identity between the owner and the person operating
the vehicle at a given time were to be upheld, by logical extension the same
presumption should be operative to those infractions which are misdemeanors.
To satisfy the criteria of due process, any fact presumed in a criminal prosecu-
tion must have a natural and reasonable relationship to the facts proven.45 A pre-
sumption is a deduction which the law requires the finder of facts to make, while
an inference is a permissive conclusion which the triers of fact may reach from a
given set of proven facts.46 The majority of the Court denied the existence of a
reaosnable natural relationship between proof of ownership and a conclusion that
the owner was operating the vehicle at a given time, thus rejecting a permissive
or mandatory conclusion to be drawn to that effect. In support of this contention
the Court pointed out that at least one million more operators' licenses are issued
than automobile registrations.
The dissenting judges relied heavily on People v. RubiZ,47 where the Court
upheld a conviction for illegal parking solely on proof that the defendant was the
owner of the automobile. The Court there stated that such proof of ownership
supplied "sufficient basis for an inference of personal conduct." More persuasively,
the minority decision contended that the supervening policy of employing scientific
devices to aid in the enforcement of traffic laws, which facilitate the lessening of
our mounting highway death toll, justifies a relaxation of the standards of proof in
a prosecution of this nature. It should be noted, however, that no parking offenses
constitute misdemeanors, and that the Rubin decision seems clearly distinguishable
on this ground. In addition, in the absence of a legislative enactment providing
for an inference or presumption of identity, the courts should not whittle away the
traditional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. 48
Disorderly Conduct
The New York disorderly conduct statute,4 9 always a fertile field for due
process objection, withstood an assault upon its constitutionality50 when the
defendant in People v. Harvey5' claimed that his attempt to relieve a policeman
of his nightstick was arbitrarily prosecuted as a misdemeanor under section 720
of the Penal Law,52 while the same elements may be treated as a mere offense
45. Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463 (1943); People v. Pieri, 269 N. Y. 315,
199 N. E. 495 (1936); People v. Ter-a, 303 N. Y. 332, 102 N. E. 2d 576 (1951).
46. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 917 (4th ed. 1951).
47. 284 N. Y. 392, 31 N. E. 2d 501 (1940).
48. People v. St. Germain, 302 N. Y. 580, 96 N. E. 2d 891 (1951).
49. N. Y. PENAL LAv § §720, 722.
50. U. S. CONST., amend. V.
51. 307 N. Y. 588, 123 N. E. 2d 81 (1954).
52. "Any person who shall , ., annoy ... any perQn , , shall be !deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor,"
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under section 722.53 Hence, the whim of the prosecutor controls whether the
greater or lesser crime will be charged.
A unanimous Court emphasized that section 720 requires that defendant's
conduct must annoy a specific "person," while section 722, subdivision 2, requires
that "others" be offended. The illogicality of punishing the former as a misde-
meanor and the latter as a mere offense was recognized, but so was the fact that
this is a legislative rather than a judicial problem. Defendant's contention that the
same act can, at the prosecutor's discretion, be prosecuted as a misdemeanor or as
an offense is in practice true, but so long as a legal distinction, no matter how
illogical or tenuous, separates them, no violation of due process can successfully
be claimed.
Misdemeanor-Manslaughter
The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule applies in cases where the independent
misdemeanor itself was committed with a criminal intent 4 This is analogous to
the felony murder situation.55 However, difficulties arise in the application of the
rule in those cases where the initial offense is merely malum prohibitum and does
not require criminal intent for conviction. In People v. Nelson" the Court ex-
tended the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule to its very limit in sustaining a convic-
tion thereunder while specifically excluding from consideration the question of
criminal intent in the commission of the misdemeanor. They held that a landlord,
the condition of whose property violated the Multiple Dwelling Law in that it
did not contain sufficient means of egress and other fire precautions57 (these viola-
tions being misdemeanors) ,58 could be held liable for manslaughter, First Degree,59
when some tenants were killed during a fire because of the inadequate means of
egress. The conviction was sustained merely on the basis of the landlord's knowl-
edge of the physical condition of the premises, diregarding any question of crim-
inal intent in the maintenance of such condition. 0
A vigorous and justified dissent maintained that the majority was carrying
the definition of manslaughter beyond its bounds in permitting conviction without
53 "Any person who . . . (2) Acts in such a manner as to annoy...
others . . ." shall "be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly con-
duct."
54. 40 c. J. s., Homicide §57, 920-921 (b).
55. People v. Grieco, 266 N. Y. 48, 193 N. E. 634 (1934).
56. 309 N. Y. 231, 128 N. E. 2d 391 (1955).
57. N. Y. MuLrIPLE DWELLING LA W §§187-189.
58. Id., §304.
59. N Y .PENAL LAw §1050 (1); "... homicide . . . committed without a
design to effect death: (1) By a person. . . committing . . . a misdemeanor,
affecting the person or property, either of the person killed, or of another ...
60. People v. Alexander, 293 N. Y. 870, 59 N. E. 2d 451 (1943), atfirmin,
267 App. Div. 762, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 940 (1st Dep't 1944).
